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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Michael Culley pleaded guilty to second degree 
murder. Mr. Culley later filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the district 
court denied. The district court imposed a unified sentence of life, with 45 years fixed. 
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Culley argued that the district court abused its 
discretion when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because he presented a 
just reason to withdraw his guilty plea. He asserted that his plea was not knowing, 
intelligent, and voluntary because he was intimidated and threatened with physical harm 
if he did not plead guilty. Additionally, he argued that after his medications were 
changed, his memory improved, and he was able to remember more details about the 
night of the murder, which he believed would help him to prove that he was not guilty. 
He also asserted that the district court abused its discretion when it imposed his 
sentence because there was a wealth of mitigating information that the district court 
failed to adequately consider. 
In response, the State argues that this Court should decline to consider 
Mr. Culley's argument regarding his motion to withdraw his guilty plea because his plea 
agreement included a waiver of his right to file such a motion. This argument fails 
because the fact that the district court considered the motion on its merits implies that it 
considered the waiver invalid. Indeed, such waivers are inherently invalid because it is 
axiomatic that if a guilty plea is not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, a waiver of the 
right to file a motion to withdraw that guilty plea cannot be knowing, intelligent, and 
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voluntary. Thus, as the district court apparently realized, consideration of the motion on 
its merits is necessary. 
Alternatively, the State argues that, should this Court consider the motion, 
Mr. Culley has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
the motion. In support of this, the State makes several arguments, most of which share 
a similar flaw; they all depend on Mr. Culley's admissions, which he had to make in 
order for his plea to be accepted in the first place. For example, the State points out 
that Mr. Culley signed the plea agreement, which included his representation that his 
decision to plead guilty was not coerced. However, the reality is that the district court 
would not have accepted the plea in the first place if Mr. Culley had not made that 
representation. And a defendant who is coerced to plead guilty has no choice but to 
make such a representation. Additionally, the State argues that there was no way 
Mr. Culley could have been under the influence of drugs which adversely affected his 
memory because he told the district court that he was not. But again, if a defendant is 
being coerced to plead guilty, he cannot admit that he is having trouble remembering 
details about the incident that led to the charges against him. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Culley's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Culley's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of 
life, with 45 years fixed, following Mr. Culley's plea of guilty to second degree 
murder? 1 
1 Mr. Culley is not replying to the issue of whether the district court abused its discretion 
when it imposed his sentence because the State's reply is not remarkable. Accordingly, 
Mr. Culley simply refers the Court back to pages 12-18 of his Appellant's Brief. 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Culley's Motion To 
Withdraw His Guilty Plea 
A. Introduction 
The State that Mr. Culley's plea agreement included a waiver of 
the right to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, this Court should decline to consider 
his motion. However, it is clear that the district court did not believe the waiver was 
valid because it ignored it and decided the motion on the merits. The transcript from the 
change of plea hearing supports this conclusion because the district court reviewed all 
the rights that Mr. Culley was waiving by pleading guilty but never mentioned waiver 
of his right to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Alternatively, argues 
that Mr. Culley failed to show that the district court abused its discretion when it 
denied his motion. This argument fails because the record makes it clear that 
Mr. Culley presented a just reason to withdraw his guilty plea. 
B. This Court Should Disregard The Waiver Of Mr. Culley's Right to Withdraw His 
Guilty Plea Because Such Waivers Are Inherently Invalid 
The State asserts that because Mr. Culley's plea agreement contained a waiver 
of his right to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, this Court should decline to 
consider the issue and affirm based on the waiver. (Resp. Br., pp.5-6.) However, as 
noted in his Appellant's Brief, the district court disregarded the waiver and decided the 
motion on its merits. (App. Br., p.2.) Indeed, throughout the proceedings, the district 
court ignored the waiver. For example, in its memorandum decision denying the motion 
to withdraw the plea, the court stated: "The State correctly asserts that the defendant 
waived his right to withdraw his guilty plea based on the terms of the Rule 11 plea 
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agreement. Ordinarily, the Court's analysis would end here as the defendant's plea was 
constitutionally valid and his rights were waived. However, this Court will analyze the 
defendant's proposed reasons as if he did not waive his right to withdraw his guilty 
plea." (R., p.139.) Therefore, although the district did not make a specific finding that 
the waiver was invalid, that finding is implicit in the fact that it considered the motion on 
its merits. See State v. OuValt, 131 Idaho 550, 553 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[i)mplicit findings 
of the trial court supported by substantial evidence should be given due deference."). 
Furthermore, the district court did not mention the waiver during the change of 
plea hearing. VVhen Mr. Culley pleaded guilty, the district court made an effort to ensure 
that Mr. Culley was aware of all the rights he was waiving. For example, when 
discussing the rights that Mr. Culley was waiving, the district court reviewed the plea 
agreement with Mr. Culley and said "[l]f you enter a plea of guilty, you're waiving your 
right to remain silent. You're waiving your right to a jury trial. You're waiving your right 
to present any defenses you have to this charge, and you're waiving your right to 
confront your accusers." (Tr. 10/9/13, p.6, L.22 - p. 7, L.1.) And, later in the hearing, 
the district court said "Also, in this agreement it provides that you agree that you will not 
file a Motion to Reduce or Amend your sentence [Rule 35 motion] once it's imposed by 
the court. Do you understand that?" (Tr. 10/9/13, p.11, Ls.17-20.) Mr. Culley 
confirmed that he did understand, and the district court stated that the plea agreement 
did not prevent Mr. Culley's right to appeal after sentencing. (Tr. 10/9/13, p.11, L.21 -
p.12, L.13.) 
Notably, the language regarding the waiver of his right to file a Rule 35 motion 
was on the same page, and in the same section, as the waiver of his right to file a 
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motion to withdraw a guilty plea. (See Plea Agreement, p.4 (attached to PSI).) Both 
waivers were listed in Section 10 of the plea agreement; the waiver of the right to file a 
Rule 35 motion was in subsection "1 0(a)," and the waiver of the right to file a motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea was in subsection "10(b)." (Plea Agreement, p.4.) The district 
court could not have missed subsection "b," but it only discussed subsection "a." This 
certainly represents substantial evidence that it found the waiver invalid. 
There are good reasons for that finding. Indeed, it is self-evident that if a 
defendant's plea is not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, the defendant's waiver of the 
right to file a motion to withdraw that plea cannot be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary 
either. Therefore, it would be unfair to enforce such a waiver. The Idaho Supreme 
Court's analysis of a similar waiver is instructive. In State v. Murphy, the Court held that 
a defendant can waive a statutory right to appeal as long as the waiver is made 
"knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily," using the same analysis for determining the 
validity of a guilty plea. 125 Idaho 456, 457 (1994 ). In that case, the Court noted that 
Murphy: 
Id. 
knew full well the consequences of waiving his right to appeal the 
judgment and sentence. In the colloquy between the district court judge 
and Murphy, the judge specifically inquired about Murphy's waiver of his 
right to appeal and confirmed that Murphy had no questions about that 
waiver. The record is clear that Murphy accepted the risks in exchange 
for the State's dismissal of three counts of kidnapping and one count of 
robbery. 
Here, by contrast, Mr. Culley was not fully informed of the consequences of his 
waiver as that issue was never discussed by the district court during his change of plea 
hearing. (See Tr., 10/9/13 generally.) At no point during the change of plea hearing 
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was the waiver of his right to file a motion to withdraw his plea discussed or 
acknowledged by the district court, or any party to the proceeding. Again, during the 
hearing, the district court informed Mr. Culley of some of the rights he would be waiving, 
such as the right to a jury trial and the right to file a Rule 35 motion, but it never 
discussed the waiver in question. (See Tr. 10/9/13, p.3, L.4- p.12, L.13.) 
Accordingly, there is substantial evidence that the district court found that the 
waiver could not be valid. The district court obviously realized that in order to determine 
whether the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, it had to first determine 
whether the plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Therefore, it disregarded the 
waiver. The State asserts that "Culley's motion was precluded by his plea agreement, 
and the district court should have declined to consider it." (Resp. Br., p.5.) However, it 
is clear that the district court comprehended the problematic and circular nature of such 
a waiver and therefore considered the motion on its merits. Accordingly, this Court 
should disregard Mr. Culley's waiver. 
C. Mr. Culley Presented A Just Reason To Withdraw His Guilty Plea Because His 
Plea Was Not Made Knowingly, Intelligently, And Voluntarily 
The State argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
Mr. Culley's motion to withdraw his guilty plea because Mr. Culley's "plea was 
constitutionally valid and Culley offered no just reason to withdraw it." (Resp. Br., p.17.) 
In support of this, the State depends, in large part, on the fact that Mr. Culley did not 
originally reveal to the district court that he felt threatened to plead guilty, and 
represented that he was not under the influence of any drugs or medication that would 
affect his ability to understand the plea agreement and its consequences. (Resp. 
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Br., pp.9-·10.) These arguments fail for the simple reason that if Mr. Culley had not 
made those representations, the district court would not have accepted his guilty plea in 
the first place. Indeed, it is only logical that any defendant who feels threatened to 
plead guilty must do everything in his power to ensure that the district court accepts his 
plea. Thus it is not surprising that the district found that Mr. Culley's responses to its 
questions were "clear, coherent, and deliberate." (Resp. Br., p.10.) If he admitted to 
the district court that he felt threatened to make the plea, or that he did not remember 
the crime clearly, the district court could not have accepted his plea. 
With respect to the State's argument that the factual basis of Mr. Culley's 
"coercion claim" was controverted by the testimony at the hearing on his motion, the 
State makes the same problematic assumption as the district court - that the jail staff 
was privy to every incident that took place between the inmates. ( See Resp. Br., pp.12-
13.) The State, like the district court, relies on the fact that the jail commander (Deputy 
Costner) testified that the jail kept a record of incidents between inmates. (R., p.140; 
Resp. Br., pp.12-13.) In fact, Deputy Costner testified that there was a video system 
that monitored all the areas of the jail. (Tr. 3/13/14, p.25, Ls.10-18.) But even with a 
video system, it would be very difficult for the staff of the jail to be aware of all such 
incidents, and clearly impossible to monitor a large percentage of the simple 
conversations that took place in the jail. 2 (R., p.140.) Such subtleties of jail life are not 
typically detectible. 
2 Deputy Costner testified that he only learned of the incident between Mr. Culley and 
Mr. Palomares because someone "advised" him that it had occurred. (Tr. 3/13/14, p.25, 
Ls.6-8.) Therefore, he went back and reviewed the video from the dining hall. 
(Tr. 3/13/14, p.25, L.10 - p.26, L.7.) This proves that the video system, while it may 
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Additionally, the threat that Mr. Culley was concerned about was the result of a 
conversation, not an altercation. In his second affidavit in support of his motion, he said 
"The individual who told me to plead guilty and not testify against the codefendant or 
else I would suffer physical harm had the name Riggs and I believe his first name was 
John." (Second Affidavit of Michael Culley in Support of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea 
- augmented to the record on 12/4/14.) The State argues that "[t]here was ... no 
record of an altercation between Culley and Riggs." (Resp. Br. p.13.) But Mr. Culley 
never claimed that there was a physical altercation. Indeed, the threat from fV1r. Riggs 
was exactly the sort of behavior that would go undetected in the jail. And Mr. Riggs was 
in the Payette County Jail and was housed with the codefendant in this case. 
(Tr. 3/13/14, p.32, Ls.8-·19.) This certainly supported Mr. Culley's claim that he was 
threatened by Mr. Riggs to plead guilty and not testify against his codefendant. Most 
importantly, it shows that the district court's finding that there was "no evidence in the 
record to indicate that the defendant was coerced into pleading guilty by threats of 
physical harm" was clearly erroneous. (R., p.140.) Instead, the evidence showed that 
Mr. Culley presented a just reason to withdraw his plea and go to trial. 
The State also argues that the district court "correctly rejected Culley's claim that 
he should be entitled to withdraw [his] plea based on his change of medication and new 
memories." (Resp. Br., p.17.) It asserts that Mr. Culley's new memories "do not 
constitute a just reason to withdraw his plea." (Resp. Br. p.16.) But Mr. Culley's 
memory of the event was certainly more detailed. (See App. Br. pp.9-12.) The State's 
have been on "24/7," was not monitored on a continuous basis, so many incidents could 
have gone undetected. (Tr. 3/13/14, p.25, Ls.17-20.) 
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argument that "Culley provided a factual basis for his guilty plea" is problematic for two 
reasons. First, while on a complex mental health medication regimen, a person likely 
can't understand the regimen's more subtle effects on memory until the medication is 
changed and memory improves. Second, even if he was initially having trouble 
remembering some of the details of the event, if he was being threatened to plead 
guilty, he would be fearful to admit that. Finally, Mr. Culley's medication was changed 
dramatically from the time Dr. Ward first met with him, in December of 2013 and 
January of 2014, to when he met with Mr. Culley again in early March of 2014 and 
stated that Mr. Culley's "memory component was improved," and he was providing more 
details about the event. (See Tr. 3/13/14, p.10, L.16 - p.16, L.8.) Indeed, Mr. Culley 
was taken off narcotic medications during that time. (Tr. 3/13/14, p.15, Ls.10-22.) This 
change alone supports the idea that his memory was better and explains why Dr. Ward 
said his speech was more "pressured" and "rapid." (Tr. 3/13/14, p.11, Ls.17-18.) 
Given the new information Mr. Culley provided about the threats made against 
him and his improved memory of the crime, Mr. Culley presented a just reason to 
withdraw his plea. Thus, the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
motion. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Culley respectfully requests that this Court vacate his judgment of conviction 
and remand his case to the district court with direction to grant his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate or remand his case to the district court for a new sentencing hearing. 
DATED this 1st day of May, 2015. 
REED P. AI\JDE 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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